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AUTONOMOUS MOTHERHOOD AND THE
LAW: EXPLORING THE NARRATIVES OF
CANADA’S SINGLE MOTHERS BY
CHOICE
By Fiona Kelly *
Abstract: In the past three decades, single mothers by choice
(SMCs) have emerged as a new and rapidly growing
component of Canada’s single mother population. SMCs are
women who choose to have a child, usually via some form of
assisted conception, with the intention that they be their child’s
sole parent. While SMCs are part of an increasing number of
non-normative family configurations in Canada, they pose
some unique social and legal questions. However, unlike some
other non-normative families, such as lesbian and gay families,
SMCs have received very little academic attention and almost
none pertaining to the role of law in their lives. In an effort to
fill this knowledge gap, this article presents the findings from a
small interview-based study of Canadian SMCs that explored
the ways in which the pre-conception decision-making and
post-birth experiences of the mothers were shaped by law.
Though the law was rarely an overt presence in the women’s
lives, they identified three aspects of becoming and being an
SMC that were nonetheless shaped by law: (i) the preconception period during which they were forced to navigate a
largely unregulated fertility industry; (ii) when making
decisions about the type of sperm donor with which to
conceive; and (iii) once they had their child, the ways in which
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everyday activities were sometimes complicated by a legal
system that assumes a two parent, biological family.
INTRODUCTION
While single mother families have long been part of the
Canadian familial landscape, in the past three decades a new
type of single mother has emerged: single mothers by choice
(SMCs). SMCs are women who become mothers, usually via
adoption or assisted conception, with the intention of being the
child’s sole parent from the outset. They choose to have and
parent their children alone, though often with substantial
networks of support around them. While the number of SMCs
in Canada appears to be growing at a fairly rapid rate, they
have received virtually no academic attention or legal
recognition. SMCs have been largely omitted from the growing
number of provincial statutory reforms related to legal
parentage 1 and, on the few occasions in which they have
appeared in Canadian courts, 2 judges have refused to accept
that a woman can choose to parent on her own. Though SMCs
rarely experience the overt intervention of law in their lives, as
this article demonstrates, the preference of law for a twoparent, biological family, can make choosing to become an
SMC fraught with legal complexity.

1

Vital Statistics Act, CCSM c V60, s 3(6); arts 538-42 CCQ; Family
Law Act, SA 2003, c F-4.5, s 5.1(1)(a); Child Status Act, RSPEI
1988, c C-6, ss 9(5) & 9(6); Family Law Act, SBC 2011, c 25.

2

Johnson-Steeves v Lee [1997] AJ no 512 (Alta QB); Johnson-Steeves
v Lee [1997] AJ no 1057
(Alta CA); Caufield v Wong, 2007 ABQB 732; G.E.S. v D.L.C.
[2005] SJ no 354 (Sask QB); GES v DLC [2006] SJ no 419 (Sask
CA); Doe v Alberta [2005] AJ no 1719 (Alta QB); Doe v Alberta
[2007] AJ no 138 (Alta CA); LB & EB c. GN, [2011] JQ no 7881.
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While single mothering by choice is growing in
popularity, there is only limited legal 3 and social science 4
research addressing the phenomenon. Because the practice is so
new, the majority of existing research focuses on
demographics, the decision-making process the women
undertake, and the social and economic reality of their lives
once their children are born. The research also derives
primarily from the United States. The lack of academic
attention given to the legal experiences of SMCs means that we
have little sense of how, and in what ways, this particular group
of single mothers interacts with the law. In an effort to fill this
3

The legal treatment of SMCs has been given limited attention in
Canada: Susan Boyd, “Autonomy for Mothers: Relational Theory and
Parenting Apart” (2010) 18:2 Fem Legal Stud 137; Fiona Kelly,
“Autonomous from the Start: Single Mothers by Choice in the
Canadian Legal System (2012) 24:3 Child and Family Law Quarterly
257 [Kelly, “Autonomous from the Start”]; Fiona Kelly, “Equal
Parents, Equal Children: Reforming Canada’s parentage laws to
recognize the completeness of women-led families” (2013) 64
UNBLJ 253 [Kelly, “Equal Parents, Equal Children”]; Angela
Cameron, Vanessa Gruben & Fiona Kelly, “De-Anonymising Sperm
Donors in Canada: Some Doubts and Directions” (2010) 26 Can J
Fam L 95; Robert Leckey, “Two Mothers in Law and Fact” (2013) 21
Fem Legal Stud 1; Susan Boyd, “Rights of Single Moms by Choice
Collide with Claims of Genetic Dads”, The Lawyers Weekly (15
February 2008) at 13.

4

Vasanti Jadva, Shirlene Badger, Mikki Morrissette & Susan
Golombok, “Mom by Choice, Single by Life’s Circumstances . . .
Findings from a Large Scale Survey of the Experiences of Single
Mothers by Choice” (2009) 12:4 Human Fertility 175; Rosanna
Hertz, Single by Chance, Mothers by Choice: How Women are
Choosing Parenthood Without Marriage and Creating the New
American Family (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006) at 13;
Fiona MacCallum & Susan Golombok, “Children Raised in
Fatherless Families From Infancy: A Follow-up of Children of
Lesbian and Single Heterosexual Mothers at Early Adolescence”
(2004) 45:8 Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry 1407.

66 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW [VOL. 28]

knowledge gap, this article presents the findings from a small
interview-based study of SMCs that addressed, amongst other
things, the ways in which the pre-conception decision-making
and post-birth experiences of the mothers were shaped by law.
The article begins with a discussion of the social and
legal context in which SMCs parent, focusing in particular on
how the rise of neo-liberalism, and its impact on family law,
has both benefitted and hindered SMCs. Part 2 provides an
overview of the study, including a demographic description of
the participants. Drawing on the interview data, Part 3 of the
article analyses the ways in which law limits and constructs the
experiences and decision-making of SMCs. The mothers
identified three aspects of becoming and being an SMC that
were shaped by the law, though rarely through overt
intervention: (i) the pre-conception period during which they
had to navigate the law, or absence of law, surrounding the
fertility industry; (ii) when making decisions about the type of
sperm donor (known or anonymous) with which to conceive;
and (iii) once they had their child, the ways in which common
activities, such as border crossings, were complicated by a
legal system that assumes a two parent, biological family. The
article concludes with some brief suggestions for reform.
SINGLE MOTHERS BY CHOICE: THE SOCIAL AND
LEGAL CONTEXT
While women who actively choose to become single mothers
have existed for some time, the prevalence of SMCs appears to
have increased substantially in the past decade. Though it is
impossible to know exactly how many Canadian SMCs there
are, a number of factors suggest their numbers are growing.
Recent statistics show that an increasing number of older
women are becoming single mothers, which accords with
research showing that SMCs tend have their first child in their
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late 30s or early 40s.5 The number of single women aged 35-39
having children has risen from 3935 in 1991 to 9706 in 2011. 6
There has also been a significant increase in births during the
same time period to single women aged 30-34 and 40-44. By
contrast, single women in their 20s have experienced little
increase in births during the same time period. Although it is
impossible to know the circumstances surrounding the
pregnancies of these solo mothers in their 30s and 40s, a
demographic not typically associated with accidental
pregnancy, it is possible that it represents a growth in single
motherhood by choice. Statistics from Canadian fertility clinics
seem to support this assertion. According to Dr Sam Batarseh,
director of IVF Canada, the number of single women coming to
his clinic for donor insemination has tripled in the last thirty
years. 7 In 2010, at Vancouver’s largest fertility clinic, single
women represented just over 13 per cent of clients
(approximately 280 women). 8 Some U.S. fertility clinics report
that up to 20 per cent of their clientele are single women. 9
The enormous growth in both face-to-face and online
support groups for SMCs also suggests a surge in their
numbers. The international organization Single Mothers by
Choice, which has chapters in most North American cities, has
grown from a one-woman operation in 1981 to an international
5

Hertz, ibid.

6

Statistics Canada, Live births, by age and marital status of mother,
Canada, CANSIM Table 102-4507 (annual).

7

Cited in Helen Buttery, “The single life: Affluent, educated and
autonomous - why are more women enjoying motherhood on their
own?”, Elle Magazine, online: Elle Magazine Online
<http://www.ellecanada.com>.

8

Statistics obtained via private communication in 2011 with Genesis
Fertility Centre.

9

See, for example, The Sperm Bank of California:
<http://www.thespermbankofca.org/content/why-choose-tsbc>.
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organization with over 13,000 members during its thirty-year
existence. 10 A second organization, Choice Moms, oversees an
active website, blog, 11 and internet message board, has
produced numerous “how to” guides as well as the book
Choosing Single Motherhood: A Thinking Woman’s Guide, and
facilitates five to ten workshops a year in the U.S. and Canada
to promote and support what it refers to as “choice
motherhood”.
Given that single mothering can be both challenging
and a much maligned identity in western society,12 one might
ask why a growing number of women are choosing to become
single mothers. There is no clear answer to this question.
However, a number of social and legal factors have combined
in recent years to create the circumstances in which single
mothering by choice may be viewed as an acceptable, or even
appealing, option for some women. The increased workplace
participation and thus economic independence of women, 13 the
growing acceptance of and availability to single women of
assisted reproduction services, and the increasing legal and

10

Information obtained via private correspondence with Jane Mattes.

11

See <http://www.choicemoms.org/>.

12

A recent Pew Research Center survey conducted in the United States
found that over 70 per cent of those surveyed thought that “mothers
having children without male partners to help raise them” is ‘bad for
society’”. Paul Taylor, Rich Morin & Wendy Wang, “The Public
Renders a Split Verdict on Changes in Family Structure”, Pew
Research Center (16 February 2011) online: Pew Research Center
<http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2011/02/Pew-Social-TrendsChanges-In-Family-Structure.pdf> at 2.

13

In 2008, 59.3% of women aged 15 and over were in paid employment
in Canada compared to 41% of women in 1976. Statistic Canada,
Women in Canada: A Gender-based Statistical Report (1 April 2011).
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social recognition of non-normative family of various kinds, 14
have created an environment in which women may feel that it
is possible to choose single motherhood. Given the prevalence
of separation and divorce, single mothering has also become an
increasingly common feature of the Canadian familial
landscape.15 Yet as this article demonstrates, while SMCs may
enjoy a more accepting social environment than single mothers
of previous generations, they nonetheless experience
significant legal obstacles unique to their position as single
mother by choice. Some of the legal challenges SMCs
experience are the product of the inherent hetero-normativity of
family law, while others stem from the growing influence of
neo-liberalism within Canadian society.
Hetero-normativity and neo-liberalism interact in the
family law context to produce some contradictory trends for
women who create non-normative families. As Brenda
Cossman has argued, neo-liberalism is not particularly wedded
to a specific family form provided that the private family can
absorb the costs of reproduction. 16 Thus, the expansion of
family law to include non-normative families, such as lesbian
and gay families, poses no direct challenge to neo-liberalism as
long as the family members are capable of internalizing costs.
In fact, some law reforms, such as the extension of spousal and
14

For example, the legal recognition of same-sex parents via provincial
parentage laws (e.g, Family Law Act, SBC 2011, c 25, ss 23-33) and
the legal recognition of same sex marriage (Civil Marriage Act, SC
2005, c 33).

15

There were over 1 million female-headed lone parent families in
Canada in 2001, an increase of 13% since 1996 and 35% since 1991.
Statistics Canada, Women in Canada (Ottawa: Target Group Project,
2006) (Catalogue No 89-503-XIE) at 38.

16

Brenda Cossman, “Family Feuds: Neo-Liberal and Neo-conservative
Visions of the Reprivatization Project” in Brenda Cossman & Judy
Fudge, eds, Privatization, Law, and the Challenge to Feminism
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002) 169 at 182.
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child support obligations to same-sex spouses, serve to extend
the reach of neo-liberalism’s privatization project.17 However,
because of neo-liberalism’s commitment to privatization – the
process whereby the costs of social reproduction are shifted
from the public sphere to the private family unit 18 – there is
typically a preference for two parent families, the assumption
being that two parents are better able to bear the costs of
privatization than one. While the second parent need not be the
child’s biological father, because biological parents have
presumptive financial obligations to their children, the desire
for a second parent often translates into finding the biological
father of the child. In fact, case law suggests that where the
biological father of a child born to an SMC wishes to be
involved in the child’s life, he is likely to succeed, even when
such an outcome is contrary to his pre-conception agreement.19
Canadian family law has also been heavily influenced
in recent decades by the fathers’ rights movement 20 which
17

See e.g, M v H, [1999] 2 SCR 3 in which the Supreme Court of
Canada held that excluding same-sex couples from the Ontario
spousal support regime was unconstitutional. One of the arguments
used to support the conclusion was that because the existing
legislation left “potentially dependent individuals without a means of
obtain support from their former partners”, it “burdens the public
purse with their care” (at para 283).

18

Cossman, supra note 16 at 169.

19

For a list of relevant cases, see note 2.
(Alta CA); Caufield v Wong, 2007 ABQB 732; GES v DLC, [2005]
SJ no 354 (Sask QB); GES v DLC, [2006] SJ no 419 (Sask CA); Doe
v Alberta [2005] AJ no 1719 (Alta QB); Doe v Alberta [2007] AJ no
138 (Alta CA); LB & EB c GN, [2011] JQ no 7881.

20

Susan Boyd & Claire Young, “Who Influences Family Law Reform?
Discourses on Motherhood and Fatherhood in Legislative Reform
Debates in Canada” (2002) 26 Studies in Law, Politics, and
Society 43; Susan Boyd, “Is Equality Enough? Fathers' Rights and
Women's Rights Advocacy” in Rosemary Hunter, ed, Rethinking
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tends to reinforce the neo-liberal preference for a second
parent, though typically out of a desire to preserve the heteronormative, patriarchal nuclear family, rather than fiscal
restraint. The effect of the fathers’ rights movement on family
law can be seen in legislative 21 or de facto presumptions in
favour of shared parenting, 22 a judicial presumption that
father/child access is in a child’s best interests, 23 and the
Equality Projects in Law: Feminist Challenges (Oxford: Hart
Publishing, 2008) 59.
21

For example, section 39 of British Columbia’s new Family Law Act,
SBC 2011, c 25, includes a presumption in favour of joint
guardianship in circumstances where the parents have cohabited. It is
speculated that the federal government will soon propose similar
amendments to the Divorce Act. C Schmitz, “Divorce Act Reforms
Could be Coming Down the Pipe”, The Lawyers Weekly (15 July
2011).

22

A number of scholars have argued that there is a de facto presumption
in favour of shared parenting already operating in Canadian family
law. This argument is supported by the dramatic increase in courtordered joint custody awards over the past twenty years, despite the
absence of any legislative impetus for the change. Statistics Canada
reported that in 2003, 44% of court-determined custody cases arising
out of a divorce resulted in an order for joint custody, more than
double the rate from the mid-1990s and four times the rate of the late
1980s. Statistics Canada, Women in Canada (Ottawa: Target Group
Project, 2006) (Catalogue no 89-503-XIE) at 40.

23

My research on supervised access decision-making demonstrated that
it is not uncommon for judges to cite a presumption, not found in the
relevant legislation, that father/child access is in a child’s best
interests. For example, the Ontario Superior Court stated in 2004 that
“[t]here is a presumption that regular access by a non-custodial parent
is in the best interests of children”: VSJ v LJG (2004), 5 RFL (6th)
319 at para 128. This assertion has been cited with approval in Elwan
v Al-Taher (2009), 69 RFL (6th) 199 at para 76 (Ont Sup Ct J); MI v
MW, [2011] OJ no 1685 (QL) at para 102 (Sup CJ); Norman v
Penney (2010), 305 Nfld & PEIR 241at para 22 (SC Trial Div);
Matos v Driesman (2009), 86 WCB (2d) 27 at para 39 (Ont Sup Ct J).
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imposition of “fathers” on lesbian families. 24 These trends have
a particularly drastic effect on SMCs. While there is only
limited case law in the area, it is common in disputes where
known sperm donors challenge the sole parentage of SMCs for
judges to draw little distinction between the legal status of men
who conceive a child via intercourse and those who donate
their sperm to a woman they know. 25 The child’s need for a
father is understood as paramount and judges assume that these
men can only add to women-led families. As Jenni Millbank
explains in the context of lesbian-headed families:
[B]ecause it is same-gendered parenting, the
addition of a male parent is not seen to take
away anything from the family (for example, by
intruding on their autonomy or invalidating their
family form), it only adds to it. The mothers are
viewed as inexplicably trying to deny their child
something good, something special and
something that their family lacks; a daddy. The
mothers’ behavior in resisting a third parent in
their family is therefore selfish, non-child
centered and weird; while the donor/father’s
behavior in trying to join or control that family
is natural, understandable and loving. 26

For a discussion of the trend see Fiona Kelly, “Enforcing a
Parent/Child Relationship at all Cost? Supervised Access Orders in
the Canadian Courts” (2011) 49 Osgoode Hall LJ 277 at 298.
24

Jenni Millbank, “The Limits of Functional Family” (2008) 22 Int’l J
Law Pol’y & Fam 149; Kelly, “Equal Parents, Equal Children”, supra
note 3.

25

For an overview of the Canadian case law see Kelly, “Autonomous
from the start”, supra note 3.

26

Millbank, supra note 24 at 162.
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Millbank’s analysis is even more persuasive in the
context of families headed by an SMC. Adding a “father” to an
SMC family is not understood as an intrusion because the
family is perceived as having an inherent “gap”: the lack of a
second parent. While lesbian parents may be able to argue that
their child already has two parents and thus their family is
complete, SMCs have the double burden of overcoming the
preference for both a father and a two-parent family.
Unfortunately, provincial parentage laws do little to
alleviate the situation for SMCs, particularly those who
conceive with known donors. The parentage laws of only one
province, Quebec, explicitly envisage the possibility of an
SMC, 27 though the sole judicial decision made under the
provision was decided in favour of the donor. 28 The very
limited case law outside of Quebec – typically access and
parentage disputes between SMCs and their known donors –
has all been concluded in favour of the donor. 29 Though each
of the cases was factually complex, the results are not
particularly heartening for SMCs. There have, however, been a
27

Article 538 of the Quebec Civil Code states that: “A parental project
involving assisted procreation exists from the moment a person alone
decides or spouses by mutual consent decide, in order to have a child,
to resort to the genetic material of a person who is not party to the
parental project.” Article 538.2 establishes states that, “The
contribution of genetic material for the purposes of a third-party
parental project does not create any bond of filiation between the
contributor and the child born of the parental project.” Thus, in the
case of a woman alone deciding to enter into a parental project the
sole filial relationship established is between the child and mother.
Civil Code of Quebec, SQ 1991, c 64.

28

LB & EB c GN, [2011] JQ no 7881.

29

Johnson-Steeves v Lee [1997] AJ No 512 (Alta QB); Johnson-Steeves
v Lee [1997] AJ no 1057 (Alta CA); C.C v A.W [2005] AJ no 428;
Caufield v Wong, 2007 ABQB 732; Doe v Alberta [2005] AJ no 1719
(Alta. Q.B.); Doe v Alberta [2007] AJ no 138 (Alta CA).
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number of statutory reforms directed at protecting the
parentage of lesbian couples that have simultaneously
benefitted SMCs. For example, several Canadian provinces
now have a statutory provision stating that a gamete donor is
not, by reason of his or her donation, a legal parent. 30Section
24 of British Columbia’s new Family Law Act states that:
If a child is born as a result of assisted
reproduction, a donor who provided human
reproductive material or an embryo for the
assisted reproduction of a child
(a) is not, by reason only of the donation, the
child’s parent,
(b) may not be declared by a court, by reason
only of the donation, to be a child’s parent,
and
(c) is the child’s parent only if determined,
under this Part, to be the child’s parent.31
Section 24 can be relied upon by any individual who
conceives a child via “assisted reproduction”, defined as “a
method of conceiving a child other than by sexual
intercourse.” 32 An SMC who conceives with a known donor
30

Vital Statistics Act, CCSM c V60, s 3(6); Civil Code of Quebec, SQ
1992, c 64, arts 538-42; Family Law Act, SA 2003, c F-4.5, s
5.1(1)(a); Child Status Act, RSPEI 1988, c C-6, ss 9(5) & 9(6);
Family Law Act, SBC 2011, c 25. While Nova Scotia’s Vital
Statistics Act, RSNS 1989, c 494, makes no mention of same-sex
couples or assisted reproduction in its birth registration provisions,
regulations under the Act permit the mother’s spouse, male or female,
to register as a legal parent where a child is conceived via “assisted
conception”, defined as “conception that occurs as a result of artificial
reproductive technology, using an anonymous sperm donor.” See
Birth Registration Regulations, NS Reg 390/2007.

31

Family Law Act, SBC 2011, c 25, s 24(1).

32

Ibid at s 20(1).
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should therefore benefit from the presumption found in section
24. It is evident, however, from the surrounding provisions, as
well as the various law reform documents that preceded the
introduction of the Family Law Act, that the assumption
underlying section 24 is that a second parent will take the place
of the gamete donor. 33 In an SMC family, this is obviously not
the case.
THE STUDY
Despite the rapid increase in SMCs in recent years, almost
nothing is known about their interactions with the law. As the
discussion above suggests, while Canadian family law is
increasingly accommodating of some non-normative families,
it continues to pose serious challenges to women who choose
to parent without a partner. In an attempt to better understand
the role law plays in the lives of SMCs, ten women who selfidentified as SMCs were interviewed. The women were all
members of their local SMC support group, lived within a
150km radius of a large Canadian city, and were recruited via
the group’s online message board. Due to the small sample
33

See for example, the Public Consultation document issued by the
Attorney General’s office in which a discussion of the legal parentage
of the birth mother is followed by the sub-heading “Who is the other
legal parent?” Similarly, the discussion of the parentage provisions in
the White Paper on Family Relations Act Reform assumes that the
birth mother has a partner and that the partner will be the child’s
second legal parent. This assumption is reflected in section 27 of the
Family Law Act, which extends presumptive parentage to the birth
mother’s spouse. British Columbia, Ministry of Attorney General
Justice Services Branch Civil and Family Law Policy Office, Family
Relations Act Review: Report of Public Consultations (British
Columbia: Civil and Family Law Policy Office, 2009) at 48. British
Columbia, Ministry of Attorney General Justice Services Branch
Civil Policy and Legislation Office, White Paper on Family Relations
Act Reform: Proposals for a new Family Law Act (British Columbia:
Civil and Family Law Police Office, 2010) at 30.
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size, it is necessary to be cautious about making any
generalizations about the SMC population in Canada.
However, given the absence of any other empirical work with
Canadian SMCs, the data nonetheless provides us with some
important insight into the SMC experience.
Demographically, the participants in the study were
virtually identical to SMCs who have participated in similar
research in the United States and United Kingdom. 34 They
were a fairly homogenous group that shared little, at least
demographically, with most other single mothers. 35 Almost all
were Caucasian, most earned over $50,000 and many had an
annual income of $75,000 to $100,000. However, two were
self-employed with variable incomes, sometimes earning as
low as $20,000 in a year. However, in both cases the women
34

Hertz, supra note 4; Jadva, supra note 4; Valerie Mannis, “Single
Mothers by Choice” (1999) 48:2 Family Relations 121; Rosanna
Hertz & Faith Ferguson, “Kinship Strategies and Self-Sufficiency
Among Single Mothers by Choice: Post Modern Family Ties” (1997)
20:2 Qualitative Sociology 187; Jane Bock, “Doing the Right Thing?
Single Mothers by Choice and the Struggle for Legitimacy” (2000)
14:1 Gender & Society 62; Susan Golombok & Shirlene Badger,
“Children Raised in Mother-headed Families from Infancy: A
Follow-up of Children of Lesbian and Single Heterosexual Mothers,
at Early Adulthood” (2010) 25:1 Human Reproduction 150.

35

The most notable difference between the SMCs interviewed and
single mothers as a broader population was with regard to economic
stability. The SMCs were significantly better off than the average
single mother in Canada. For example, the average income of the
SMCs interviewed was well above that of single mothers generally
($42,300 in 2008) and, while two of the women had experienced a
year or two of low income (usually by choice), none were living in
poverty. By contrast, 21 per cent of Canadian single mothers live in
poverty (compared to nine per cent of the general population and
seven per cent of single fathers). Statistic Canada, Women in Canada:
A Gender-based Statistical Report (2011) (Catalogue no: 89-503XWE).

Autonomous Motherhood and the Law

77

had chosen to reduce their workload so they could spend more
time with their child, a luxury most other single mothers do not
enjoy. Almost all had attended university, with half holding a
graduate degree, a figure substantially higher than the general
population. 36 Most of the women were professionals of some
sort, with their occupations including accountant, lawyer,
school counselor, and a professional staff member at a
university. Their average age at the time of their first child’s
birth was 38 and all but one had only one child. The average
age of the children was three. All of the women were biological
mothers who had conceived their children via donor
insemination or in vitro fertilization. Two of the women
conceived with known donors, while the remaining eight used
anonymous donor sperm purchased from a sperm bank. Six of
the eight anonymous donors were designated “open identity”
which meant that the donor’s identifying information could be
accessed by the child upon reaching the age of majority.
While the women who participated in the study were
demographically similar to SMCs interviewed for other
research, two features distinguished the sample from others.
First, less than half of the women owned the property in which
they lived. The majority rented 1 or 2 bedroom apartments or
lived in co-operative housing, and few anticipated being able to
purchase a home in the near future. While the lack of home
ownership might suggest that the women interviewed for this
study were not as financially secure as SMCs who participated
in other studies, the more likely explanation is that the cost of
housing in the region is unusually high. Notably, the three
women who owned houses lived in semi-rural areas, well
outside of the city. The second demographic difference was
36

According to Statistics Canada, 6.5% of working-age Canadians in
2010 had a graduate degree. Statistics Canada, “Table 282-0004 Labour force survey estimates by educational attainment, sex and age
group”
online:
<http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/12-581x/2012000/edu-eng.htm>.
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that only half of the women identified as heterosexual, a figure
considerably lower than recorded in other studies. One woman
identified as lesbian, one as queer, one as bisexual, and two
described their sexuality as undetermined or “in progress”. It is
difficult to know why such a large proportion of the women
identified as something other than heterosexual as there is no
indication from other research that queer women are attracted
to single mothering by choice at greater rates than heterosexual
women. That said, the region in which the women live is
known for its progressive politics and large, well-established
lesbian and gay communities. It is therefore possible that nonheterosexual women are simply a greater percentage of the
overall population than in other places, or that living in a
politically progressive environment makes women feel more
comfortable exploring their sexuality.
With the exception of these two demographic
differences, the study re-confirmed that SMCs tend to share a
number of distinct characteristics: they are usually in their late
30s or early 40s, well educated, financially independent, and
Caucasian. SMCs are thus a fairly privileged group of women,
particularly when compared to single mothers by chance or
those who become single mothers due to separation or divorce.
There is no doubt that the class and race privilege of the SCMs
interviewed enhanced their ability to choose single motherhood
as well as navigate the legal system. In particular, because they
were largely capable of economic self-sufficiency, they were
able to avoid the economic stigma associated with single
motherhood in the neo-liberal era.37
37

Relying on historical data, Lori Chambers has argued that women
who choose to become single mothers and who have sufficient
economic independence to support their child may experience less
stigma than single mothers who live in poverty. Lori Chambers,
Misconceptions: Unmarried Motherhood and the Ontario Children of
Unmarried Parents Act, 1921 to 1969 (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2007).
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While all of the women interviewed indicated that they
had “chosen” to become single mothers, self-identified as
“single mothers by choice”, and considered themselves to be
parenting autonomously, it is important that the notions of
“choice” and “autonomy”, terms that are closely associated
with liberal individualism and a central feature of the neoliberal project, be problematized. As the demographic analysis
indicates, the freedom to “choose” single motherhood is
primarily reserved for a certain class of women: well educated,
middle to upper class, white women, who are able to purchase
the services required to achieve single motherhood and deflect,
via their race and class privilege, the stigma traditionally
associated with the status. Thus, while women who “choose” to
parent alone may attract a degree of social acceptance, that
acceptance is contingent on the woman’s capacity to absorb the
costs of her (autonomous) social reproduction and be
independent from the state. Given the social and economic
context in which they parent, it is not surprising that some
SMCs become, perhaps unwittingly, proponents of neo-liberal
thought. At the same time, many SMCs, including those
interviewed for this study, embrace a version of autonomy that
is best described as relational.38 Rejecting the paradigm of the
autonomous liberal individual, most had created rich networks
of support that often included other SMCs. Thus, their
autonomy was “nourished in relationships with others.” 39
Though they did not expressly challenge the social structures
that demanded self-sufficiency of them, they did undermine
them in small ways by building self-sufficiency through
relationship.
38

Jennifer Nedelsky, Law’s Relations: A Relational Theory of Self,
Autonomy, and Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
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Sumi Madhok, Anne Phillips & Kalpana Wilson, eds, Gender,
Agency, and Coercion (Thinking Gender in Transnational Times)
(Houndmills: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013).
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Single motherhood by choice and the law
While a number of themes emerged from the interviews, this
article focuses on the mothers’ interactions with the law.
Participants were provided with a number of opportunities
during the interview to reflect on the role, if any, law played in
their lives. Specific questions related to accessing fertility
services, choosing a donor, and establishing parentage,
provided an opportunity to discuss the most common legal
challenges. However, there were many other instances during
the interviews where legal regulation of various kinds emerged
as a topic for discussion.
When discussing the role of law in their lives the
mothers identified three areas of common concern. The first,
referred to by almost all of the mothers, was the lack of legal
regulation surrounding the fertility industry. The second was
with regard to choosing a sperm donor. Many of the mothers
preferred, or would have at least considered the possibility of,
using a known donor but felt that the lack of certainty
surrounding the legal status of such an individual made the
choice too risky. The final set of concerns raised by the
mothers related to post-birth challenges to their status as sole
parents, typically by government employees during fairly
routine activities such as border crossings.
The legal regulation of the fertility industry
The evolution of reproductive choice in the modern era means
that women have access to a dizzying array of reproductive
technologies that enable pregnancy without a partner. The
fertility industry, made up of both fertility clinics and sperm
banks, now welcomes single women with open arms. The
reproductive autonomy enabled by such clinics sets SMCs
apart from many other single mothers. Achieving pregnancy
through the services of a fertility clinic, though expensive,
allows women to take control of the process of becoming a
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mother, reduces the legal and health complications that may be
associated with other methods of conception and, because of
the availability of anonymous donor sperm, enables them to
achieve motherhood in a manner that protects their autonomy
as their child’s sole parent. Yet almost all of the mothers felt
that the fertility clinics and sperm banks were not sufficiently
regulated and that the lack of legal regulation was not in the
interests of either themselves or their children.
Eight of the ten women interviewed conceived using
anonymous donor sperm through the services of a fertility
clinic. None experienced any barriers in accessing a clinic or
purchasing sperm and most indicated that they felt welcome as
single women. However, many of them argued that the
regulatory environment surrounding the fertility industry was
extremely troubling. The most common complaint pertained to
the lack of legal control over the number of offspring each
donor could produce and the perceived dishonesty of the sperm
banks with regard to this issue. A smaller number of women
complained that the few regulations that did exist, such as those
pertaining to the use of known donor sperm within a clinic
environment, 40 were misguided and particularly onerous for
single women.
By far the most common concern the women had about
the fertility industry, and the issue around which they felt most
vulnerable, was the complete absence of statutory regulation of
sperm banks. In particular, the women were concerned that,
despite strict regulations with regard to how sperm is
processed, Canadian law places no limit on the number of
offspring produced by a particular donor. It is thus possible for
40

Processing and Distribution of Semen for Assisted Conception
Regulations (SOR/96-254); Technical Requirements for Therapeutic
Donor Insemination (Health Canada Directive, July 2000) online:
<http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/dhp-mps/alt_formats/hpfbdgpsa/pdf/prodpharma/semen-sperme_directive-eng.pdf>.
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a child to have in excess of a hundred donor siblings. For
Sally, whose daughter has at least 70 half-siblings, this
information, inadvertently gleaned during a conversation with a
sperm bank employee, caused significant distress. As she
explained, “Well, I kind of freaked out internally [when I found
out]. I mean I had an internal freak out, just in terms of the
number, the number of half siblings.”
In addition to placing no limits on the number of donor
offspring, Canada also has no independent watchdog
overseeing the industry, which means that sperm banks can,
and do, make assertions about offspring numbers that go
unchecked. For example, Canada’s only sperm bank,
ReproMed, is self-regulating. In its internal guidelines it claims
to attempt “to limit Donors to three live births per region of
100,000 populations. Siblings of the same patient using the
same Donor are considered one live birth.” 41 As has been
pointed out by a Canadian journalist, this could entail as many
as 75 donor offspring living in a city the size of Toronto. 42
ReproMed also claims to perform “regularly scheduled surveys
of our physicians and treatment outcomes of their patients, and
employs these data to monitor use of certain Donors in
particular geographical areas.” 43 Yet, there is no legal
requirement that parents report the conception or birth of a
child using sperm from ReproMed. In fact, a U.S. study of
5000 sperm bank users conducted in 2011 by the American
Society of Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) found that 35 per
cent of participants had not or did not plan to report their

41
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“Donor FAQ”,
donor_faq>.

online:
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Tom Blackwell, “Limit pregnancies by same sperm donor: Fertility
experts”, National Post (8 September 2011) online: The National Post
< http://news.nationalpost.com>.
“Donor FAQ”, supra note 41.
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pregnancy to the sperm bank. 44 As the authors of the study
noted, this lack of reporting “does not allow for accurate
pregnancy tracking to limit the number of family units per
donor.” 45 The situation appears to be similar in Canada. In fact,
a number of the women interviewed noted that, while they had
reported their pregnancy to the fertility clinic, they had not
known until several years after the fact that they were also
supposed to notify the sperm bank.
While the situation in Canada is concerning, an
estimated 95 per cent of sperm used in Canadian fertility
clinics is actually imported from the United States. 46 The
largest provider of sperm to Canada appears to be Fairfax
Cryobank which claims to cover “over 80% of the Canadian
sperm market.” 47 Fairfax’s policy for limiting offspring
numbers can be found on the bank’s website. It states:
Fairfax Cryobank limits the total number of
births for any donor based on the application of
several criteria. Specifically, a donor's sales will
cease when either of the following criteria is
reached:
1 When 25 family units (children from the same
donor living in one home) have been reported in
the US. International distribution stops when 15
family units have been reported. After the family
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unit limits have been met, vials will only be
distributed for sibling pregnancies; OR
2. Total number of units sold reaches our
designated limit (actual numbers are not
disclosed).48
According to the first part of the policy, Fairfax appears to cap
distribution at 40 families worldwide. While this may appear
modest on a global scale, it is necessary to take into account the
ASRM finding that approximately 35% of families will not
report their pregnancies. If it is assumed that each of the
reporting families has between 1-3 children (siblings are
treated as only one child under the policy), the 40 family units
will have produced approximately 80 children. If the
unreported children are added (an additional 35% of families,
each with 1-3 children) a single Fairfax donor may have
produced up to 108 offspring. When one also takes into
account that women often “sell on” leftover vials through
online groups or that some men donate to more than one sperm
bank, 49 the numbers may be considerably higher. The second
element of the Fairfax policy, which can be applied as an
alternative to the first paragraph, is similarly concerning. The
second option available to Fairfax is to cease sales of a
particular donor when the bank’s designated limit, which it
expressly refuses to disclose, is reached. With no way of
knowing what the limit might be or how it is calculated
(reported births? speculated births? vials sold?), one can only
speculate as to how many children a donor might produce.
48

Emphasis added. “Read First”, online: Fairfax
<http://www.fairfaxcryobank.com/ReadFirst.shtml>.
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A study of 63 donors, surveyed about their experiences of anonymous
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bank. Tabitha Freeman et al, “Sperm and Oocyte Donors’
Experiences of Anonymous Donation and Subsequent Contact with
their Donor Offspring” (2011) 26:3 Human Reproduction 638 at 640.
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Given the existing situation, it is not surprising that the
mothers expressed concern about the lack of regulation
surrounding sperm banks, both in Canada and the United
States. While most of them admitted that they went into the
process of choosing a donor with considerable naiveté, now
that they knew more about the fertility industry they felt that
the absence of a regulatory framework had created a situation
that was not in their children’s interests. The women’s
concerns began with the lack of information provided by their
fertility clinic with regard to choosing a donor. None of the
women was given any choice about which sperm bank they
purchased from. Nor were they told that sperm banks have
different policies with regard to matters such as offspring
limits, the availability of open-identity donors, and how the
bank deals with notifications of serious illness in children
conceived using donor sperm. Rather, the fertility clinic told
their clients which sperm bank they worked with and instructed
them to purchase sperm from that bank, typically online. This
made it virtually impossible for women who were aware of
differences between sperm banks to exercise any choice.
Casey, for example, wanted to import sperm from The Sperm
Bank of California (“TSBC”), a non-profit fertility clinic that
was established by feminists in the 1980s. TSBC was the first
sperm bank in the United States to offer services to lesbian
women, provide open-identity donors, and cap offspring
numbers at 10 per donor. TSBC also maintains contact with
families who use their services so that they can accurately track
offspring numbers. However, because the clinic Casey
approached did not do business with TSBC, she was told that it
was not an option. After investigating the two sperm banks that
were available to her, Casey concluded that both had
questionable practices with regard to offspring numbers.
Frustrated with her lack of choice, Casey eventually chose to
pursue at-home insemination with the sperm of a known donor.
Once the women had their children, many of them
began to hear troubling information about sperm bank
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practices, often through conversations with other SMCs. Over
time, a number of them developed a critique of the industry.
The most common criticism was that the sperm banks are
dishonest and that their dishonesty had the potential to create
social issues for children conceived using donor sperm. As
Rachel explained, she was led to believe by the sperm bank –
and she presumed donors were provided with similar
information – that each donor might produce five or six
children. She was also given the impression that the sperm
bank follows up with clients in an effort to track births, which
she now knows is not true. Concerned by what she was hearing
about offspring numbers from other SMCs, Rachel contacted
the sperm bank to ask how many children her daughter’s donor
had produced. She was told that it was the bank’s policy that
such information not be disclosed. Rachel was instead referred
to the website which categorized each donor’s offspring
numbers as 5, 10, 15, or “20 plus”. Rachel’s donor fell into the
last category. As Rachel put it, “That could be 21, or it could
be a hundred!” Due to this experience, Rachel felt quite
strongly that sperm banks should be legally regulated and, in
particular, that regulations should dictate a limit on how many
offspring a donor can produce. She argued that this was
particularly important in the case of open-identity donors,
where there was often an expectation on the part of parents that
the donor would be willing to meet the child. As she explained:
[The open-identity donors will] disappear when
they realize they have 150 children! I think that
the whole thing has been presented a little bit
misleadingly. By the banks and, you know,
maybe not ever intentionally, but I think that a
lot of the donors were led to believe they might
have five or six children. And when they find
out they have a hundred, they might not be so
willing to be known.
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Sally shared Rachel’s concerns, though in Sally’s case,
her fears had been realized. When her daughter was an infant,
Sally logged on to the Donor Sibling Registry to determine
how many donor-siblings her daughter had. There were 67
children reported. Given that many families are not aware of
the DSR and others may not wish to join, the likely number of
donor siblings was, as Sally put it, “mind boggling”. Sally’s
donor had chosen an “open identity” status, which meant he
was willing to have his contact details released to offspring
when they turned eighteen. Sally felt it was completely
unrealistic that a donor in such a situation would have the
willingness, or capacity, to meet or even communicate with 67plus children. While she did not envisage her daughter ever
having a relationship with her donor, Sally was nonetheless
frustrated with a system that promoted and charged additional
money for open-identity donors, but did not limit the number of
offspring they produced. She argued that sperm banks should
be forced by law to restrict offspring numbers, 50 particularly in
the case of open-identity donors, as well as to implement a
system of compulsory reporting so that submitting paperwork
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For example, in the U.K., the Human Fertilisation and Embryology
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to the sperm bank was part of the birth registration process. 51
Both Sally and Rachel also expressed concern about the risk of
inadvertent dating amongst donor siblings in large sibling
groups, particularly given that the SMC community was fairly
close-knit.
While most of the women called for more regulation of
the fertility industry, several noted that the minimal regulation
that did exist had a disproportionately negative impact on
SMCs. The most frequently noted concern was with regard to
the limits imposed by Health Canada on a woman’s use of
known donor sperm where the donor is not the woman’s sexual
partner. While a woman can conceive using the sperm of a
known donor via home insemination without express
regulation, 52 if she finds it necessary to employ the additional
expertise of a fertility clinic the same donor is subject to the
Processing and Distribution of Semen for Assisted Conception
51

Several Australian states have introduced compulsory reporting
registries for individuals involved in donor conception. For example,
in the state of Victoria, Part 6 of the Assisted Reproductive Treatment
Act 2008 (Vic) created a registry, administered by Births, Deaths and
Marriages, which records information about people involved in donor
conception. The Central Register records information about births
arising from the use of donor sperm, eggs or embryos since July
1988. The treating clinic provides the Registry with information
about the parents, the donor, and the child that has been born. When
registering a birth, the parent needs to confirm on the birth
registration statement that donor conception occurred. The Act also
introduced a second registry, the Voluntary Register, which allows
people who have been involved in donor conception in Victoria
before July 1988, to voluntarily register information about themselves
and their willingness to exchange information with other persons on
the Voluntary Register.
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Regulations (“the Regulations”). 53 The Regulations apply to all
sperm used in fertility clinics in Canada where the recipient
and donor are not in a sexual relationship. They include a series
of exclusion criteria that prohibit certain men, such as men over
40 and men who have had sex with another man, from
donating. 54 The objective of the Regulations is to protect the
health of women who purchase anonymous sperm from sperm
banks. However, they apply equally to a woman who conceives
via assisted conception with a donor who is known to her but
with whom she has no sexual relationship. Such a woman, if
she wishes to conceive at a clinic with the sperm of her known
donor, must apply to the “Special Access Programme”. 55 Under
the programme an excluded donor can be permitted to donate,
provided he submits to extensive testing. This includes being
tested for infectious diseases, having his sperm quarantined for
6 months, and then being retested. If all the tests are negative,
the woman’s physician may apply to Health Canada for a
53

Processing and Distribution of Semen for Assisted Conception
Regulations SOR/96-254.
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Technical Requirements for Therapeutic Donor Insemination (Health
Canada, July 2000), paras 2.1(b) & 2.1(c)(i). The exclusions
contained within the Technical Requirements for Therapeutic Donor
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Attorney General of Canada, 2007 ONCA 11, it was held that men
who have sex with men are deemed to be at higher risk of carrying
certain infectious diseases, such as HIV, and the sperm of men over
the age of 40 is believed to have higher rates of “spontaneous genetic
mutations” than the sperm of younger men (at para 42). The
challenge failed in part because men who fall within the excluded
categories may be able to donate if they are accepted under the
special access program.
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special access authorization. The physician must indicate that
he or she has explained and identified any health risks to the
recipient woman. Health Canada will then review the
application and either approve or reject it. There is no certainty
that a donor will be approved by virtue of going through the
process. A woman who conceives through a fertility clinic with
the sperm of her sexual partner is not subject to these
regulations.
For Beth, who began her journey towards becoming an
SMC when she was 42, the Regulations proved to be a
significant legal hurdle. It was Beth’s first choice to conceive
with the assistance of a male friend who was willing to be
known to any prospective child. However, after numerous
unsuccessful attempts at home insemination, Beth began to
wonder if employing the services of a fertility clinic might
help. When she approached a clinic in the city in which she
resided, she was told that, though she had been conducting
inseminations using her donor’s sperm for months, the clinic
could not assist her because her donor was 43 and gay, and thus
excluded under the Regulations. Beth later discovered that this
information was inaccurate. It was possible to use her donor’s
sperm if he was willing to apply under the Special Access
programme. However, knowing that her age meant she had a
limited timeframe in which to conceive, Beth decided to pursue
other options.
The other options available to Beth were limited,
however, by her lack of predictable resources. With an unstable
income that varied from month to month, Beth found the
regular
costs
associated
with
purchasing
sperm
56
overwhelming. Frustrated by the situation, Beth felt driven to
56

The purchase of sperm is the most significant cost associated with
donor insemination. Most women reported that the sperm they
purchased cost $500-$800 a vial. The inseminations themselves cost
approximately $250.
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engage in higher-risk activities in order to get pregnant.
Following her failed attempts to conceive with the first known
donor, Beth made an arrangement with an American man she
met online through one of the many “free sperm” websites. As
Beth told the story, she expressed embarrassment about the
risks she took, noting in particular the “disgusting, grotesque,
narcissistic” men she encountered on the free sperm websites
who “all seemed to [want] sex without condoms.” However,
she felt compelled to follow that route because of her age, the
cost of sperm, and the limits imposed upon her by the Health
Canada regulations. As she reflected, “Well, the cost is, is so
high that I did do unsafe things. The law as well. It pushed me
to get more and more risky. So I feel like those barriers pushed
me to do things that I would have never ever thought of.” After
months of trying to get pregnant at home, Beth had saved
enough money to fund two more inseminations at a fertility
clinic using open-identity donor sperm. On the second attempt,
she became pregnant and, at 43, she gave birth to her daughter.
While she was happy to have finally become a mother, she
expressed considerable frustration with the law for limiting her
reproductive autonomy, especially in a manner that seemed
particular to SMCs.
Choosing a sperm donor in the shadow of the law
Given that eight of the ten women interviewed conceived using
the sperm of an anonymous donor one might assume that
SMCs have a preference for anonymity. The interviews,
however, revealed a much more complex picture. Six of the
eight women who conceived with the sperm of an anonymous
donor stated that they would have preferred to use a known
donor. While none provided exactly the same reasons for their
preference, common explanations were that a known donor
would be accessible to the mother and child if needed, was less
likely to produce large numbers of children, would be able to
provide ongoing medical information, and did not charge for
his sperm. Several of the women also noted that conceiving
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with a known donor meant they could avoid the fertility
industry and the medicalization of conception. Yet, despite the
perceived advantages of a known donor, these six women felt
that a choosing one was too great a legal risk.
Sara, for example, considered conceiving with a known
donor and had even discussed the possibility with an old friend.
However, once she started investigating the matter she
discovered that the choice raised some substantial legal
concerns. As Sara explained:
I did a little bit of research and I wasn’t sure
about the legalities of it. There’s still a lot that’s
unknown, I don’t know. I don’t think it’s, I want
to say bullet proof…I might have given more
consideration to it, the known donor, if there had
been a little bit more legal certainty around it.
Chelsea had also favoured a known donor but
developed similar concerns, particularly after she joined her
local SMC group and received emails about ongoing litigation
involving SMCs in Canada and elsewhere. As she explained:
All the stuff I saw, the emails and stuff like that,
it just, I just cannot imagine having an
agreement in place, having parental rights
severed, and then, for whatever reason, being
able to have that challenged at a later date in any
way, shape, or form. Whether the person
changed their mind or the person passed away,
or whatever. Cause obviously we all have [the]
best interests of our children at heart. And we
want, we’re just trying to protect them beyond
anything else. And how that can be changed,
like, I just. It just isn’t right.
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Many of the women who favoured known donors but
ultimately decided against them expressed similar concerns,
referring to such arrangements as “dangerous”, “legally risky”
or, as Sally put it, “a hot bed of legal crazy.”
The women were justified in fearing known donors.
Single women in Canada who have conceived, whether via
intercourse 57 or assisted conception, with a known donor who
has subsequently sought access through the courts have
uniformly lost their cases. 58 Courts have refused to consider
known donors to be anything but legal fathers and have
awarded access on a routine basis. Even in Quebec, the only
jurisdiction in Canada in which the possibility of a single
mother by choice is explicitly recognized via legislation (even
when conception occurs via intercourse), 59 the case law has not
been encouraging. 60 Once the women joined their local SMC
group they became aware of this legal environment and, with
the case law as a backdrop, few of them felt comfortable
pursuing a known donor arrangement.
Despite all of the risks involved, two of the mothers,
Casey and Marjorie, nonetheless chose to conceive with known
donors. Interestingly, both women identified as lesbians and,
because of their involvement in the lesbian community, were
familiar with the legal challenges associated with known donor
arrangements long before they decided to have a child on their
own. Perhaps because of their familiarity with the legal issues,
both Casey and Marjorie chose to engage with the law during
57
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the pre-conception period in an attempt to clarify the legal
relationships involved. They each received independent legal
advice from a lawyer who specialized in lesbian and gay
parenting arrangements and entered into written agreements
with their donors. Though they included a variety of issues, the
essence of the agreements was that the donor was not a legal
parent and that the mother was the child’s sole parent.
Despite their engagement with the law, Marjorie and
Casey knew that there was little they could do to protect
themselves legally. For example, both women understood that
the agreements they had entered into, and paid a considerable
amount of money to have prepared, were of little legal value.
Yet, they clung to the few legal mechanisms available to them
out of fear. As Casey explained:
I knew the agreement wasn’t worth much more
than the paper it was printed on. However, I
knew that it was a huge mistake not to have one.
You know, it doesn’t, it’s one of those situations
where there’s this gap in the law. Where all,
where the best thing one could do, according to
the advice I had was to state our intentions and
move forward from there. Which is what I did.
As Casey’s comment suggests, the women understood that
despite their attempts to engage the law, they remained legally
vulnerable. In particular, they struggled with the idea that they
could not formally sever any legal rights the donor might have,
creating a situation of constant uncertainty. As Marjorie
explained:
I think it would be useful for SMCs to have a
single person be able to be the sole legal parent.
Because it, you know, it does put us into legal
jeopardy. Because as far as I know you can’t, I
can’t legally [sever] Sam’s [parental rights],
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without having a second person to put on the
birth certificate in his place. And I think that’s
dangerous, because it leaves the parent and any
children conceived out of that donor
insemination agreement perpetually at risk of,
you know, custody or access [disputes]. Or, you
know Sam…was cut off from his family of
origin because he’s gay, and so we’ve never had
to deal with, you know, what his siblings or
grandparents think. But, you know, if Sam and I
had had this agreement and he was the one who
had the early death and his parents wanted to go
after my kids because they were his genetic
information, or that sort of thing. Like I, that’s
again not my particular case. But I could see that
being a concern for single parents by choice.
[They] need to be able to be a sole legal parent
without having to have a second name [on the
birth certificate]. You know, if the agreement is
that you’re intentionally bringing a child [into
the world] on your own…the law should support
that.
While Marjorie’s donor, Sam, was respectful of their
agreement, Marjorie nonetheless understood that she was, at
least objectively, “perpetually at risk.” While Marjorie could
live with this uncertainty, Casey could not.
Casey conceived her daughter with a known donor, a
friend who was supportive of her decision to become an SMC.
They each received independent legal advice and signed a
written agreement that stated that Casey was the sole parent
and the donor would only be known to the child upon the
child’s request. Knowing that “the agreement wasn’t worth
much more than the paper it was printed on”, Casey asked her
lawyer whether there were any other legal mechanisms
available to clarify her sole parent status. Casey’s lawyer noted
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that an increasing number of lesbian couples with known
donors were applying, at the time of their child’s birth, for a
declaration of legal parentage that served to sever any parental
rights the donor might have. 61 Though an SMC had never
attempted to secure such a declaration, and would not be able
to provide a second parent to fill the void left by the donor, the
lawyer speculated that Casey might still be able to utilize the
procedure. When her daughter was a few months old and, with
the support and consent of the donor who had never met the
child, Casey applied for such a declaration. The response was
swift and shocking.
Within 48 hours of filing the application “it blew up.”
Casey’s lawyer was told that if the application were pursued,
the Attorney General would oppose it and “take her all the way
to the Supreme Court of Canada.” Given the threat, as well as
the leaking of the case to the media, Casey withdrew her
application. As Casey explained:
The Attorney General intervened and had a
complete fit at the mere idea that the province
would support a woman to be a sole parent. That
this was something to be pitied and not sought
after, this particular role. And that certainly the
state had an obligation to object. Because it
would open the door for letting dead beat dads
off the hook everywhere. And, it would elevate
the status of sole parents in society and make
this seem like a legitimate family structure, like
when in fact it’s, the impression I got really is
that it’s, you know, morally, legally, everything
else objectionable to the state at this time. And
61
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they made it clear that they would go all the way
to the Supreme Court of Canada and fight this
tooth and nail. And my lawyer just said, hands
down, it’s a resource-based system. You will be
dragged through the courts for ten years. If you
choose to fight this, you will absolutely lose. . .
You’d be completely crazy to even try it. You
do not go up against a force like that. They’ve
made it clear that they’ll stop at nothing to make
sure you do not get to be legally recognized as
the sole parent of your child.
Casey’s experience demonstrates how invested, both
economically and socially, the state remains in perpetuating the
two parent family. The fear that SMCs will become a strain on
the public purse or that single motherhood will become a
“legitimate” form of family represent the hallmarks of both
neo-liberal and neo-conservative thought. The intervention of
the Attorney General also suggests that if SMCs attempt to
pursue recognition of their families in the courts, they will face
strong opposition.
Interestingly, Casey’s story did not end with the
withdrawal of her application. Adamant that she be recognized
as her child’s sole legal parent, she applied six months later to
complete a single parent adoption of her own child as a
backdoor way by which to achieve sole parentage. In a bizarre
turn of events, the application was allowed. Casey and her
donor consented to the severing of their parental rights and
then Casey adopted her daughter as a sole parent. The entire
matter was completed before a desk clerk and left Casey
bewildered. As she explained:
The first step was to give up my rights as a birth
parent. I did do that even though it’s just, I think
it’s highly objectionable. I objected to having to
do that on all kinds of grounds. And certainly,
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you know, the Attorney General is a fool in my
mind that it even got passed as easily as it did. I
thought the desk clerk must have been drunk or
something at the time. To like, they did not even
question what this was. They signed off, no
problem. So the idea that my plan to be my
child’s sole parent wasn’t viable or acceptable to
them, but I could adopt my own child without a
blink of an eye. It’s like, holy smokes!
While Casey achieved her goal of becoming her daughter’s
sole legal parent, she was concerned about the future. For
example, she noted that she had recently filled in several forms
which asked whether her child was adopted. She had not
known how to respond given that her daughter was both her
birth child and adopted. She also worried for her daughter who
would likely face similar administrative problems as she got
older. Casey thus lamented the fact that the law was not more
welcoming to SMCs, arguing that the failure of the law to
acknowledge her family had created a much more damaging
legal situation for her child.
Casey’s story, coupled with the small number of
judicial decisions involving SMCs, demonstrate exactly why
many of the women felt that, despite their individual
preferences, it is simply too risky to conceive with a known
donor. 62 Anonymity brought with it legal certainty and, for as
long as the law refused to respect a woman’s decision to parent
on her own, it remained the most sensible option for most
SMCs.
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My research on lesbian mothers revealed similar findings. While
about a third of the mothers I interviewed chose to conceive with a
known donor, many more would have done so had the law provided
some clarity as to the donor’s legal status. Fiona Kelly, Transforming
Law’s Family: The Legal Recognition of Planned Lesbian
Motherhood (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2011) at 98-101.
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Post-birth legal autonomy
Once the women had their children, most were surprised to find
that they experienced little overt challenge to their sole
parentage. None were challenged when they registered their
child’s birth as a sole parent, or when they applied for a
passport or birth certificate. Enrolling their children in daycare
and school also posed no challenge. That the women were
rarely questioned about their assertion of sole parentage by
bureaucratic bodies such as Vital Statistics is interesting in
light of the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Trociuk v
British Columbia. 63 In Trociuk, the biological father of triplets
challenged the mother’s decision to exclude him from their
children’s birth certificates and give them her surname only.
The mother excluded the father on the basis that they had only
briefly co-habited prior to the children’s conception and that
she was essentially raising the triplets on her own. Finding in
favour of the father, the Supreme Court held that the statutory
provisions 64 that permitted the mother to “arbitrarily” exclude
the father from the children’s birth certificates and the process
of naming infringed upon his Charter equality rights. 65 Given
the decision in Trociuk, it is surprising that none of the women
were questioned about their child’s paternity when registering
the birth or applying for a birth certificate. Rather, the assertion
of sole parentage by the mothers was accepted without
question, suggesting that Trociuk has had little impact on the
day-to-day practices of Vital Statistics.
Reflecting on why their status as sole parents was
rarely questioned by the numerous bureaucratic bodies they
encountered, some of the women suggested that they were
simply the beneficiaries of a progressive and tolerant
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Trociuk v British Columbia (AG) [2003] 1 SCR 835.
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Vital Statistics Act, RSBC 1996, c 479, s 3(1)(b).
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Trociuk, supra note 63 at paras 15-19.
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environment. For example, Lisa, who had moved to Canada in
her thirties, believed that the diversity of the city in which she
lived meant that she experienced a greater level of acceptance
than she would have in her country of origin. As Lisa
explained:
I think it’s just a very open community where I
know that [my son] is not going to be the only
child with a single parent, you know. So I think
it’s the demographics of [this city] where there’s
so many different families. And I think we are a
lot more of an accepting community. I get that
sense anyways, so that’s why I didn’t really
hesitate to…do it. Had I been in [my home
country], I don’t know if I would have got as
much support. Um, but I’ve never done it, so
who knows?
Lydia, who grew up on the Canadian prairies, also
argued that the diversity and progressiveness of the city in
which she lived made it conducive to becoming an SMC.
Before having her daughter, Lydia had considered moving back
to her hometown to be closer to family, but when she explored
the websites of the local fertility clinics she noticed that, in
stark contrast to the clinics in the city in which she lived, single
women were not even mentioned. She also failed to locate a
local SMC support group. Fearing that she might find herself
legally and socially marginalized in the prairies, Lydia decided
to stay put.
Several of the women speculated that they also reduced
the likelihood of bureaucratic challenge by approaching
situations pro-actively. For example, a number of the mothers
noted that when they enrolled their child in a new daycare or
school they usually made an appointment with the appropriate
official to discuss their family situation. This was designed to
reduce speculation about the family’s circumstances and

Autonomous Motherhood and the Law

101

circumvent any challenge to the mother’s assertion that she was
the child’s sole parent. Given that many school and daycare
enrolment forms require the contact details of the child’s father
or, if the parents are separated, a custody agreement indicating
each parent’s level of access, the mothers felt it best to address
the issue pro-actively. As Lydia, who always wrote “Not
applicable” on the “father” section of forms, explained, “I’m
straight up with everybody, you know? I don’t want them to
feel uncomfortable asking and have the awkwardness there. It’s
more proactive as opposed to waiting.”
While few of the women had experienced overt legal
challenge to their assertion of sole parentage, most had felt the
subtle impact of a legal and social environment that assumes
and favours the two-parent, biological family. Whether filling
in school enrolment forms or crossing international borders, the
women found themselves carefully negotiating a normative
environment that rendered them suspect. The circumstance in
which the women were most frequently challenged as SMCs
was when they travelled internationally with their children.
Border crossings usually resulted in extensive questioning of
the women and, sometimes, their children. Interestingly, all of
the women who had experienced harassment during border
crossings noted that Canadian immigration officials were the
most likely to challenge them and were the most rigorous in
their questioning. Lisa described a fairly typical situation where
she was returning to Canada from the United States with her
toddler son:
I went to the States. I was grilled on the way
back to Canada. I only ever travel with his
passport. I’d never considered that I needed his
birth certificate. And the guy at the border
crossing on the way back said, “Okay, well,
who’s his dad?” And I said, “Well, he doesn’t
have one.” And he said, “He’s got to have one.”
I said, “You know, I had a donor. He’s a donor
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baby.” And he said, “Well, what’s to say you’re,
you know, you’re not taking him out of the
country?” And I was like, “Well, I’m coming
back into Canada!” So there was this whole big
thing. So he, he gave me, you know, a bit of the
third degree. And I was like, okay, but I’ve
never been asked this before. And he said, “But
you’re just telling me you’re his Mum.” “Well, I
am!” And he said, “Well, you know, you should
have his birth certificate.” So, of course the next
three times I went across the border I had his
birth certificate and his passport and nobody
asked.
While immigration officials have an obligation to ensure that a
child is not being abducted, the women felt that the guards
subjected them to an unusual level of questioning, particularly
once they asserted that their child did not have a father. After
her experience with the border guard, Lisa suggested that birth
certificates include some mechanism for verifying that the
child has only one legal parent so questioning of the kind she
experienced could be avoided.
In an attempt to diminish challenges such as those
experienced at the border, many of the women had obtained a
letter from their fertility clinic indicating that their child was
donor conceived and had only one parent. A number of the
women noted that border officials routinely asked for a clinic
letter as “proof” when the mother asserted that the child was
donor conceived, suggesting that such letters have become part
of the legal fabric surrounding SMCs. Of course, only those
who conceive at a fertility clinic can produce such a letter,
reinforcing the vulnerability of women who conceive with
known donors. Marjorie, who conceived her two daughters
with a known donor, travels with a statutory declaration stating
that she is their sole parent. However, she quickly noted that “it
has no real legal standing.”
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While the women experienced little overt legal
challenge to their assertion of sole parentage, they were all very
conscious of the times where they were potentially vulnerable.
They carefully negotiated those situations by being pro-active
and gathering supporting documentation, perpetually ready to
meet the challenge. Though few complained about the situation
in which they found themselves, a number voiced frustration
that even in the face of dramatic legal and social change, the
non-normative nature of their families attracted additional
surveillance.
CONCLUSION
The law was rarely an overt presence in the lives of the SMCs
interviewed, but it nonetheless shaped some key aspects of
their motherhood. Provincial parentage laws denied them a
mechanism by which to clearly establish their sole parentage
and required them to accept legal uncertainty if they wished to
conceive with a known donor. The law’s preference for, and
assumption of, a two-parent family meant that they needed to
be pro-active in explaining their situation in order to avoid
bureaucratic challenge. Finally, the women found that the lack
of law surrounding the fertility industry meant that sperm
banks and fertility clinics determined important issues such as
the number of offspring a donor could produce. While law
reform was not an explicit topic of the interviews, the women
expressed support for reforming Canada’s legal parentage laws,
as well as the fertility industry. Most supported a complete
overhaul of provincial parentage laws to include the explicit
recognition of SMC-headed families and clarification of the
legal status of known donors. All of the mothers also called for
reform of the fertility industry, with many noting that Canada
needed to develop its own sperm banks so that the lack of
regulation in the United States would no longer be a burden
experienced by Canadian SMCs.
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At present, SMCs have little voice at the law reform
table. Despite representing approximately 13 per cent of clients
using fertility services in British Columbia, SMCs were not
mentioned once in the many law reform documents associated
with British Columbia’s new parentage laws. It is thus not
surprising that the reforms offer only minimal recognition for
SMCs. Yet, as their numbers grow and their sense of
community is strengthened, there is no doubt that SMCs will
join lesbians, gay men, and other non-normative families at the
bargaining table, demanding recognition of their families of
choice.

